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ZONES: BALANCING FREE SPEECH
AND PATIENTS' RIGHTS
Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Hill v. Colorado,' the Supreme Court ruled on the consti-
tutionality of a provision of a 1993 Colorado statute 2 restricting
speech activity outside health care facilities. The statute's provi-
sion makes it unlawful to "knowingly approach" within eight
feet of another individual to pass a pamphlet, show a sign, or
engage in "oral protest, education, or counseling" without con-
sent if the individual is within one hundred feet of a health care
facility's entrance! The Court upheld the statute and found
that it was a content-neutral, narrowly tailored, valid time, place,
and manner restriction that served significant governmental in-
terests.
4
This case resolved the outstanding issue of whether a float-
ing buffer zone implemented by statute, as opposed to by in-
junction, was constitutional. Prior Supreme Court cases had
determined that injunctions specifying fixed buffer zones
around a medical facility were constitutional, 5 but that a fifteen-
foot floating zone around an individual required by a court-
imposed injunction was not constitutional.6
This Note argues that the Court's holding was correct under
First Amendment precedent. Free speech is not an absolute
right, and protected speech is subject to limitations.7 The Su-
' 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000).
2CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122 (1999).
" COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999).
4 Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2482-83 (2000).
" See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994).
6 See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 361
(1997).




preme Court has previously found that expressive activity, even
in public forums, is also "subject to reasonable time, place, or
manner restrictions ... provided that they are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and that they leave open ample alternative channels for com-
munication of the information."" The Hill Court deemed the
provision a restriction on place, and evaluating the provision us-
ing this standard, it appropriately found the restriction to be
content-neutral because it did not restrict specific subject mat-
ters or viewpoints and served a legitimate purpose independent
of the content.9
In the case at hand, the restricted activity intrudes on the
individual rights of others, including the safeguarding of citi-
zens' health and safety, unobstructed access to health care facili-
ties, and privacy interests. This Note contends that the Court
should have explicitly extended the captive audience doctrine
to patients attempting to access health care facilities and relied
on the unwilling captive audience's interest, rather than focus-
ing on unobstructed access and patient welfare.'l
Lastly, this Note argues that the Court correctly found that
the statute is narrowly tailored, leaving available alternative
means of communication," and examines the potential impact
of the decision on the drafting and enforceability of future
buffer zone legislation. 2
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE SHIFT IN ABORTION DISCOURSE AND JUDICIAL/
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
Few topics elicit greater controversy in the United States
than abortion. While the Colorado statute does not specifically
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). See
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Note that content-based
speech regulations are subject to strict scrutiny, while content-neutral regulations face
intermediate scrutiny by the Court. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
9 See infra Part V.A.
'0 See infra Part V.C.
"See inftaPartV.D.
"See infta Part V.E.
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address abortion, abortion protestors, as likely targets for prose-
cution, challenged the statute.'3 Since 1992, the abortion con-
troversy has shifted focus from the actual procedure itself to
demonstrators' free speech. 4 Some argue that stifling discourse
about legal restrictions on abortion has led to greater violence
and that any further limitations will heighten the violence. ' 5
Others believe that clearly defined boundaries on demonstra-
tions are necessary barriers to violence'6 and contend that
"[p]rotecting the safety of patients at reproductive health care
facilities is crucial because without access, the constitutional
right to abortion will become a nullity."' 7 Diana DeGette, a pro-
ponent of the Colorado statute, described the activity around
abortion clinics as "in-your-face screaming, spitting on people,
thrusting ghastly pictures right into their faces."'
Courts have responded to violent and obstructive protest
around abortion clinics by awarding injunctions.' 9 These in-
junctions have included various combinations of fixed buffer
zones, whereby demonstrators may not come within a specified
radius of a clinic, and bubble zones, whereby demonstrators
" Petitioners' Brief at *2-4, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856)
(describing petitioners as "sidewalk counselors" opposed to legalized abortion who
changed their activities around clinics out of their fear of prosecution).
14 Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, New Millennium, Same Old Speed: Technolog'
Changes, but the First Amendment Issues Don't, 79 B.U. L RE%,. 959, 984 n. 108 (1999).
is Note, Safety Valve Closed: The Removal of Nonviolent Outlts for Diwent and the Onset
of Anti-Abortion Violence 113 HARV. L Rv. 1210, 1211 (March 2000).
16 Brief of Amici Curiae the State of New York et al., in Support of Respondents at
14-15, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856):
The decisions of this Court that have upheld statutes that have established buffer zones be-
tween demonstrators and the objects of their demonstrations are consistent with actual po-
lice experiences, which show that having dcear, predictable guidelines understood in
advance by all parties (including the police officers themselves) reduces violent confronta-
tions at health care facilities while preserving the First Amendment rights of protestors.
Id.
17 Deborah A. Ellis & Yolanda S. Wu, Of Buffer Zones and Brohen Bones: Balancing Ac-
cess to Abortion and Anti-Abortion Protestors'First Amendment Rights in Sdhend, v. Pro-Choice
Network, 62 BROOK. L REV. 547, 547-48 (1996).
" David Olinger, State High Court Affirms Abortion 'Buffer Zone,' DENR Posr, Feb.
17, 1999, at B1.
" See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 376
(1997) (where District Court for the Western District of New York issued a prelimi-
nary injunction); Madsen v. Women's Health Center. Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 758 (1994)
(where Florida Circuit Court expanded an injunction). See also Tara K. Kelly, Note,
Silencing the Lambs: Restricting the Fat Amendment Rights of Abortion Clinic Protestors in
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 68 S. CL.U L RE%,. 427, 431-32 (1995).
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must remain a certain distance from individuals entering the
clinic. 0 State legislatures and city councils have also responded,
enacting numerous statutes and ordinances addressing the issue
of abortion protests outside medical facilities in the past dec-
ade.2' Additionally, in May 1994, Congress enacted the Free-
dom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ["FACE"],22 which
focused on physical blockades and threats around abortion clin-
ics. A 1999 clinic safety study reports that 32 percent of the 360
23clinics surveyed were protected by some sort of buffer zone.
Furthermore, 39 percent of these clinics describe the enforce-
ment of their buffer zones and injunctions as "strong.2 4 This
was nearly three times the number reported in 1998 (14 per-
cent) .2
B. THE VALIDITY OF PRIOR BUFFER ZONES AND BUBBLE ZONES
The Supreme Court previously has addressed the constitu-
tionality of various buffer zones around health care facilities. In
the 1994 case Madsen v. Women's Health Care Center, Inc.,20 the
Court examined a court-imposed injunction that included a
smaller zone prohibiting picketing within thirty-six feet of the
facility and a larger zone of three hundred feet in which only
invited protestors were allowed. The Supreme Court, however,
upheld only part of the thirty-six-foot buffer zone.
"o See Schenck, 519 U.S. 357 (where District Court for the Western District of New
York issued a preliminary injunction); Madsen, 512 U.S. 753 (where Florida Circuit
Court expanded an injunction). See also Kelly, supra note 19.
22 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 602.11(a) (West 1999) (prohibiting intentional
blocking of access to health care facility); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1114.2(a) (1996)
(prohibiting interference with access to health care facility in addition to unreason-
able noise); MD. CODE ANN., Crimes and Punishment, Art. 27, § 577B (1999) (prohib-
iting intentionally stopping another from accessing a medical facility). See also
PHOENIX, ARIZ., CODE § 23-10.1 (1993); SANTA BARBARA, CAL., CODE § 9.99 (1993);
PENSACOLA, FLA., CODE § 8-1-18 (1995).
18 U.S.C. § 248 (1998).
23 1999 National Clinic Violence Survey Report, Feminist Majority Foundation.




21 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
27 Id. at 759-60.
28 Id. at 776.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, examined
the government's purpose in creating the restrictions, deter-
mined that they were not directed at the contents of the speech,
and thus ruled the restrictions were content-neutral.2 The
Court noted that if the restriction had been statutory, the Ward
v. Rock Against Racism standards' would apply."1 However, exam-
ining the differences between injunctions and statutes, the
Court concluded that the differences mandate a "more strin-
gent application of general First Amendment principles in [the
injunction] context."12  Not only do ordinances represent the
legislature's policy choices, but injunctions impose a greater risk
of biased and discriminatory application compared with ordi-
nances.33 Rejecting the Ward test as too lenient for injunctions,
the Court stated that "[w] e must ask instead whether the chal-
lenged provisions of the injunction burden no more sspeech
than necessary to serve a significant government 
interest."
The Court thus upheld the thirty-six foot-buffer zone-1 sur-
rounding the entrance and driveway because that restriction
burdened only enough speech to serve the significant govern-
ment interest of ensuring entry to the clinic as well as prevent-
ing blocked traffic on the road• The state court had found that
petitioners consistently impeded access to the clinic in the past,
that a less restrictive initial injunction had failed to prevent this,
that petitioners would not be forced to be further than ten to
Id. at 762-64.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 804 (1989), proscribed that a time,
place, and manner regulation of speech is constitutional as long as it is content-
neutral, serves a significant government interest, is narrowly tailored to serve that in-
terest, and allows ample alternate channels for communication.
s' Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765.
' Id. Justice Stevens, in his separate opinion, disagreed with the majority's com-
parison of injunctions and statutes and contended that a more lenient standard was
appropriate for injunctions because the subjects of the injunction had engaged in
wrongdoing. Id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens then concluded that the "physically approaching" prohibition in the three-
hundred-foot zone was constitutional. Id. at 782.
"Id. at 764.
'4 id.
"The state court prohibited petitioners from 'congregating, picketing, patrol-
ling, demonstrating, or entering' any portion of the public right-of-way or private
property within 36 feet of the property line of the clinic. ..." Madsen v. Women's
Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994).
Id. at 768, 770.
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twelve feet from approaching cars, and that protestors forced to
stand on the other side of the street could still be seen and
heard from the parking lot of the clinic.
In contrast, the Court rejected the thirty-six-foot buffer zone
on the back and side of the facility because it found that this
part of the injunction did not address the relevant government
interest of preserving access to the clinic: the protestors had not
blocked that area and individuals did not need to cross that area
to gain access to the clinic.3 8 The Court also struck down an
"images observable" provision because the ease with which a pa-
tient could avoid the message by simply averting her eyes made
that restriction overly burdensome in its attempt to limit threats
to patients."9 In addition, the Court rejected the three-hundred-
foot consent zone around the facilities because it burdened
"more speech than necessary to prevent intimidation and to en-
sure access to the clinic."4 0  Lastly, the Court struck down a
three-hundred-foot zone around residences because this restric-
tion was simply too large and would result in a general ban on
marching through the neighborhood."
A few years later, in 1997, the Court again considered the
constitutionality of buffer zones around medical clinics. In
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York,42 Chief Justice
Rehnquist again wrote for the majority and recognized the sig-
nificant governmental interests at issue, including: "ensuring
public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on
streets and sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting
a woman's freedom to seek pregnancy-related services."" The
Court upheld a prohibition on "demonstrating" in a fifteen-foot
fixed buffer zone around clinic entrances and driveways estab-
lished through an injunction, finding it necessary to ensure ac-
cess to the clinic.
The Court, however, struck down a provision creating a fif-
teen-foot floating bubble zone against demonstrations around
'7 Id. at 770-71.
Id. at 771.
"Id. at 773.
'0 Id. at 774.
Id. at 775-76.
519 U.S. 357 (1997).




persons and vehicles accessing the clinic because that provision
burdened more peech than necessary to protect the govern-
mental interests. Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that the
floating zones were "a broad prohibition," preventing the coun-
selors "from communicating a message from a normal conversa-
tional distance or handing leaflets to people entering or leaving
the clinics who are walking on the public sidewalks." G The re-
striction required that a demonstrator maintain at all times a fif-
teen foot distance of separation from the individual, thus
requiring the demonstrator to move as the individual moved .
In moving with one person, the demonstrator must remain
cognizant of the locations of other individuals so as not to in-
vade their fifteen-foot bubble.4 ' The Court found that uncer-
tainty would result, leading to an overburdening of speech."
Subsequent to these two Supreme Court cases, the Second
Circuit upheld a floating bubble zone of five feet created by an
injunction stemming from a FACE violation."' On the other
hand, the Ninth Circuit struck down a Phoenix ordinance that
established eight-foot floating buffer zones around health-care
facilities whereby a demonstrator was required to actively with-
draw if requested.5' While the Ninth Circuit found that the or-
dinance served the government interests of protecting access to
the facilities, preventing harassment and intimidation, and safe-
guarding medical privacy, 2 it found that the ordinance, al-
though content-neutral, was not narrowly tailored because,
similar to Schenck, the protestor would experience uncertainty
concerning compliance.5Y Later, the Ninth Circuit upheld a
California ordinance prohibiting protestors from a fixed eight-
foot buffer zone around both health care facilities and places of
worship, but, following Sabelko, rejected a floating buffer zone
within one hundred feet of the same facilities.? Further, while
federal circuit courts have maintained that FACE is constitu-
4 Id. at 377.
45 It
47 Id. at 378.
'a Schenk v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 378 (1997).
49 id.
See United States v. Scott, 187 F.3d 282, 289 (2d Cir. 1999).
SeeSabelko v. City of Phoenix, 120 F.3d 161, 165, (9th Cir. 1997).
52 Id. at 164.
Id. at 164-65.
See Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara, 150 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1998).
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tional,5 the United States Supreme Court has not reviewed
these federal circuit rulings.
C. THE COLORADO STATUTE AT ISSUE
The Colorado General Assembly enacted Colo. Rev. Stat. §
18-9-122 in 1993 in response to a practice of verbal abuse and
physical assaults outside health care facilities.5 6 The statute ad-
dresses the problems of harassment and violence outside of
such facilities, including abortion clinics. 7 Prior to enactment,
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees of the Colorado
General Assembly held hearings where testimony addressed the
conduct of protestors, including intimidation, and impeding ac-
cess to clinics.53 While only seven percent of 60,000 clinic pa-
tients were there to contemplate an abortion, all patients were
subject to the admonitions of protestors.59 The testimony also
included reports of protests by groups such as animal rights ac-
tivists outside of health care facilities.64 Furthermore, a witness
declared that "protesters create a particularly difficult situation
for persons with physical disabilities who lack the physical capa-
bility to move through crowds."
61
The legislature detailed the public health considerations in
subsection 18-9-122(1):
The general assembly recognizes that access to health care facilities
for the purpose of obtaining medical counseling and treatment is im-
perative for the citizens of this state; that the exercise of a person's right
to protest or counsel against certain medical procedures must be bal-
anced against another person's right to obtain medical counseling and
treatment in an unobstructed manner; and that preventing the willful
obstruction of a person's access to medical counseling and treatment at
a health care facility is a matter of statewide concern. The general as-
sembly therefore declares that it is appropriate to enact legislation that
" See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 154 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Weslin, 156 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996).
' See Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Colo. 1999).
57 COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-122 (1999).






prohibits a person from knowingl obstructing another person's entry to
or exit from a health care facility.
The statute then details two separate subsections restricting
activity around health care facilities, which it defines as "any en-
tity that is licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized or permit-
ted by law to administer medical treatment in this state. "6
Subsection 2, which was unchallenged in this case, states that
"[a] person commits a class 3 misdemeanor if such person
knowingly obstructs, detains, hinders, impedes, or blocks an-
other person's entry to or exit from a health care facility. "fA
The petitioners chose to focus their complaint solely on subsec-
tion 3, which dictates that:
No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight
feet of such person, unless such other person consents, for the purpose
of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in
oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person in the pub-
lic way or sidewalk areas within a radius of one hundred feet from any
entrance door to a health care facility.
The statute makes violation a class 3 misdemeanor punish-
able by a $750 fine and up to six months in prison."
Legislators decided on the distance of eight feet by first
moving around a room until they found a separation that pro-
vided comfort but allowed conversation at a normal tone of
voice and then measuring their separation with a tape meas-
ure.' Former Colorado Rep. Diane DeGette stated: "It's about
two arms' lengths away. If a protester holds up a leaflet, I can
lift my hand and take the leaflet. "Os Thus, Ms. DeGette consid-
ered both pamphleteering and conversation for the size of the
bubble zone.' The Colorado State Legislature enacted CSA sec-
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(1) (1999).
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(4) (1999).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(2) (1999).
6'COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999).
' Michael Romano, 'Bubble Law' Remains Intact, Rocxy MoUNTAiN NEs, June 29,
2000, at 4A.
6 Mike Soraghan, DeGette Celebrates Decision. Ruling Upholds Law She Drafted, DENVER
PoST,June 29, 2000, atA9. (The two state legislators were Sen. Mike Feeley and Rep.
Diana DeGette. DeGette stated, "A lot of thought went into it [the distance]. We






tion 18-9-122, and it became effective April 19, 1993. The stat-
ute experienced widespread support, with eighty-five of the one
hundred legislators approving the measure. As of June 2000,
Ms. DeGette claimed that no one had been arrested for violat-
ing the statute and the temperament of protests had calmed.7'
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioners included Leila Jeanne Hill, Audrey Himmel-
mann, and Everitt W. Simpson, Jr., all abortion opponents act-
ing as "sidewalk counselors" to women seeking abortions.72
Believing that women terminate pregnancies in part because
they lack information about abortion alternatives, petitioners
attempted to "educate, counsel, persuade, or inform pedestrians
and occupants of motor vehicles in areas adjacent to medical
clinics about abortion and abortion alternatives. 74 Petitioners
incorporated written cards, leaflets, pamphlets, and a fetal• 7 5
model in their counseling. Posters included photographs from
abortions and text such as "Abortion Kills Children," and Mr.
Simpson wore a sandwich board with both textual and visual
messages.7 6 After Colo. Rev. Stat. section 18-9-122(3) became ef-
fective, petitioners modified their counseling methods out of
fear of prosecution, but believed that these "changes have made
their expressive activities more difficult and less effective. 7
Five months after Colorado adopted the statute, the plain-
tiffs filed a complaint in the District Court for Jefferson County,
Colorado, seeking a declaratory judgment that section 18-9-
122(3) facially violated the First Amendment, as well as a per-
manent injunction against its enforcement. 8 Plaintiffs alleged
that their fear of prosecution under section 18-9-122 caused
70 Romano, supra note 66.
" Soraghan, supra note 67.
7Hill v. City of Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670, 673 (Colo Ct. App. 1995).
73 Petitioners' Brief at *2, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856).
7' Hill 911 P.2d at 673.
7 Id.
76 Petitioners' Brief at *3, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856).
nId. at *4.
78 Hill, 911 P.2d at 672. See also Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2000). "Pe-
titioners' complaint alleged the statute was unconstitutional under both a facial and
an as-applied challenge. However, as the statute had not yet been enforced, the trial
court correctly ruled that the challenge was facial only." Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d
1246, 1248 n.2 (Colo. 1999).
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them "to be chilled in the exercise of fundamental constitu-
tional rights,"* and named District Attorney David J. Thomas,
the City of Lakewood, Attorney General Gale A. Norton, and
the State of Colorado as defendants (referred to hereinafter as
"the State")Y.s In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the
statute violated the right to free speech found in the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution."' The complaint con-
tended that it was not possible to remain on the sidewalk as well
as remain at a distance of eight feet from others while perform-
ing their counseling u The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the
statute was an unconstitutional content-based restriction lacking
a compelling government interest, and furthermore, that the
statute was vague, overbroad, and an invalid prior restraint."
The State later filed a motion for summary judgment, alleg-
ing the statute was constitutional."' The State appended to the
motion the legislative hearing transcripts, which included testi-
mony about the use of escorts outside of clinics to assist with
clinic access and protect patients from aggressive counselors as
well as against the risk that these heated interactions would
negatively impact patients' medical care." While evidence was
submitted about confrontational demonstrations blocking ac-
cess to the clinics, there was no evidence that the defendants
engaged in such hostile behavior.8 In turn, the protestors filed
a cross-motion for summary judgment alleging the statute was
facially unconstitutional.87
A. COLORADO TRIAL COURT UPHELD THE COLORADO STATUTE
In an unpublished opinion, Judge Gaspar F. Perricone en-
tered summary judgment for the State, declaring the statute a
constitutional restriction that did not violate the First Amend-
ment."' While Judge Perricone agreed with petitioners that the
Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2485 (citing Petitioners' Brief, at *18-19, Hill (No. 98-1856)).
"Hi/4 911 P.2d at 672-73.
S1 Id.
8 d. at 672.
See Hi, 120 S. Ct. at 2485.
See id. at 2486.
.IL
"Id
"Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Colo. 1999).
ESee Hil, 120 S. CL at 2486; Petitioners' Brief at *1, *5, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct.
2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856).
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statute addressed a 'quintessential' public forum, 9 he relied on
Ward to hold that the statute permissibly imposed a valid con-
tent-neutral time, place, and manner restriction.0 He found
that the extension of the statute beyond protest to education
and counselin contributed to the application of the statute to
all viewpoints. He further noted that the legislative history
confirmed that the State did not favor some viewpoints over
others and concluded that the statute left available ample alter-
native means of communication. Finally, he determined that
the statute was not overbroad, vague, nor a prior restraint.93
B. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED
Petitioners appealed the summaryjudgment ruling, but the
Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. Judge Ruland found that
the Colorado statute, like the injunction in Madsen v. Women's
Health Center, Inc.,95 did not apply only to anti-abortion speech,
but rather equally limited speech supporting abortion or ad-
dressing organ transplants.96 Concluding that the statute did
not discriminate based on viewpoint, the court applied the con-
tent-neutral criteria set forth in Ward.97 Significant government
interests were at issue including safe and unimpeded access for
patients and staff to medical facilities.98 In addition, reasonable
alternatives for communication were available, and the statute
did not burden speech more than what was reasonably neces-
sary.9 Therefore, the Colorado restrictions were deemed per-
missible.'0 0
Defining "knowingly" based on the criminal code and "pro-
test," "consent," and "counseling and education" using Web-
" Traditionally, public streets and sidewalks are considered public forums typically
held open for public communication in the form of assembly and debate. See Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988).
9 Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2486.
" Id.; Petitioners' Brief at *5, Hill (No. 98-1856).
9Hill 120 S. Ct. at 2486.
9' Id. at 2486-87.
' Hill v. City of Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670, 672 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
9'512 U.S. 753 (1994).
96Hill, 911 P.2d at 673.
9






ster's Dictionary, the court rejected the contention that the
statute was vague for failing explicitly to define certain terms
within the statute itself.'0' The Court of Appeals further de-
clared that there was no authority for extending the prior re-
straint doctrine beyond the typical situation-where a
government entity has the discretion to allow or not allow cer-
tain activity-to a situation where private citizens may decide
whether others may confront them.'°2
C. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT VACATED AND REMANDED
After the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court in 1997 vacated the judgment of
the Court of Appeals of Colorado.' °3 The Court remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals for its reconsideration based on
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York.' O' In response to
the Colorado Court of Appeals' request for supplemental
briefs,1' 5 the petitioners contended that because Schenck struck
down a floating zone of fifteen feet, the Colorado floating bub-
ble of eight feet also should be rejected.'6 Petitioners further
relied on Schenck for the proposition that there is no right to be
let alone on a public sidewalk, that fifteen feet is too distant for
normal conversation, and that "it is difficult to determine when
one is less than a specified distance from a patient or staff
member, thus making compliance with the statute difficult."'0 7
D. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS AGAIN AFFIRMED
Upon remand, the Court of Appeals rejected these argu-
ments and again upheld the statute.? Judge Ruland began by
noting that the Schenck court "expressly declined to hold that a
valid governmental interest in ensuring ingress and egress to a
medical clinic may never be sufficient to justify a zone of separa-
tion between individuals entering and leaving the premises and
10' Hill v. City of Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670, 674 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
'OId. at 675.
'3 Hill v. Colorado, 519 U.S. 1145 (1997).
104Id.
1' Hill v. City of Lakewood, 949 P.2d 108 (Colo. C. App. 1997).





protestors. '09 The Colorado Court of Appeals again relied on
Madsen to determine that the Ward standard applied, given that
the Madsen court had noted that the appropriateness of the
Ward standard had the restriction been a general statute."0 Un-
der this criterion, the court upheld the Colorado statute be-
cause it was a narrowly tailored restriction that provided ample
alternative means of communication."'
The case at hand is distinguishable from Schenck because
eight feet, unlike fifteen feet, allows sufficient protection of
speech, and a protestor could approach once they obtained the
consent of the individual.1 1 2 The court focused on the govern-
ment interests at issue (especially consideration for the dis-
abled), ruling them sufficient to justify the restrictions.' '3 In
response to the argument that it would be difficult to assess an
approach of eight feet, the court noted that the level of mens rea
the statute required is "knowingly," so inadvertent violation is
not prosecutable. 
4
E. COLORADO SUPREME COURT AFFIRMED ENBANC
The plaintiffs again appealed, and the Colorado Supreme
Court granted certiorari and affirmed the lower courts en banc."'
Justice Scott wrote that the statute was a reasonable time, place,
and manner restriction on speech under the Ward standard.""
The court further noted that even the petitioners no longer
disputed that the statute was content-neutral . Significantly,
the Colorado General Assembly "was concerned with the safety
of individuals seeking wide-ranging health care services, not
merely abortion counseling and procedures.""8 The court re-
counted the development of cases supporting the right to pri-
vacy and concluded that the statute is a reasonable action to
facilitate this fundamental right."9
109 Id.
110 Id.
.". Hill v. City of Lakewood, 949 P.2d 107, 109 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
112 Id. at 110.
"s Id.
114 rd.
". Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246 (Colo. 1999) (en banc).
"' Id. at 1253-54.
1 id. at 1251.
"' Id. at 1258.
"9 Id. at 1253.
[Vol. 91
HILL V COLORADO
Noting the Supreme Court directive to consider Schenck, the
court determined that Schenck is appropriate only to judicially
created injunctions, not to statutes.' As explained in Madsen,
"injunctions... carry greater risks of censorship and discrimina-
tory application than do general ordinances," and thus, the
court gives greater latitude to statutes. -2 ' Additionally, the Colo-
rado statute is less restrictive than the Schenck injunction be-
cause the statute does not prohibit a person from standing still
and communicating his message.122
The court declined to rely on the Ninth Circuit's reasoning
in Sabelko v. City of Phoenix,'23 which used the Ward test to rule
that an ordinance creating an eight-foot floating buffer zone
was not narrowly tailored and thus unconstitutional. 24  The
Colorado Supreme Court ruled that Sabelko was not binding
authority and was factually distinguishable.' In Sabelko, the
protestors were required to withdraw from another person upon
request even if the protestor did not move.'6 "In other words,
under the Sabelko ordinance, if a protestor stood still and an in-
dividual came within eight feet, the protestor would have vio-
lated the ordinance." 2  In contrast, the Colorado statute does
not impose this duty to retreat: if the protestor stood still then it
would not be a violation because of the inclusion of the word
"approaching" in the statute.'28 If the protestor does not actively
approach the patient, then the protestor may not be prose-
cuted.'9
The Colorado Supreme Court further found that section 18-
9-122(3) is narrowly tailored."0 The court noted that, under
'
2' Id. at 1255.
121 Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1255 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (citing Madsen V.
Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994)).
' Hill, 973 P.2d at 1257-58 ("What renders this statute less resictive than... the
injunction in Schenck ... is that under section 18-9-122(3), there is no duty to with-
draw placed upon petitioners, even within the eight-foot limited floating buffer
zone.")
2 120 F.3d 161 (9th Cir. 1997).




' Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1255 (Colo. 1999) (en bane).
1 Id.
"a Id. at 1257.
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Ward, narrowly tailored does not mean "the least restrictive or
least intrusive means of doing so.", 1' The court focused on the
combination of the mens rea "knowingly" and the actus reus "ap-
proaching.' ' 32 If either of these is missing, the protestor is not
subject to prosecution. This sufficiently tailors the statute: a
protestor need not worry about unintentional actions or speak-
ing while standing still. Finally, the court determined that
ample alternative communication channels existed: All people
"are still able to protest, counsel, shout, implore, dissuade, per-
suade, educate, inform, and distribute literature regarding
abortion."034  One can still communicate in normal conversa-
tion, display signs, and approach up to eight feet of another
person.' Unsatisfied with the Colorado Supreme Court's rul-
ing, petitioners again appealed.
F. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT GRANTED CERTIORARI
After this long path through the lower courts, the case fi-
nally found resolution in the United Stated Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari in 1999.136 Groups submitting amicus
briefs supporting petitioners were the Life Legal Defense Foun-
dation, 1 7 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
("PETA"), I ' the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), 36
and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus-
trial Organization ("AFL-CIO") ."0 In contrast, amicus briefs sup-
- Id. (citingWard v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,798 (1989)).
132 id,
" Id. at 1257-58.
's Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1255, 1258 (Colo. 1999).
Id. at 1258-59.
1 Hill v. Colorado, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999).
'-7 Amicus Brief of Life Legal Defense Foundation, 1999 WL 1045139, Hill v. Colo-
rado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856).
'" Brief Amicus Curiae of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals in Support
of Petitioners, 1999 WL 1032802, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-
1856).
"9 Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Peti-
tioners, 1999 WL 1045141, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856).
(While the ACLU typically supports the reproductive rights of women, its concern for
First Amendment protections led it to argue for the rejection of the Colorado stat-
ute.)
40 Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organi-
zation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 1999 WL 1034471, Hill v. Colo-
rado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856).
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porting the respondents included submissions by the United
States;4' the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action
League, National Abortion Federation, NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund;'4 2 the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists and the American Medical Association;'43 the
City of Boulder and the City and County of Denver; '1 4 and a
brief in which the attorneys general for eighteen states joined.'
IV. SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
O'Connor, and Souter joined, whereby the Court affirmed the
judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court and upheld the con-
stitutionality of Colo. Rev. Stat. section 18-9-122(3).'r In his
analysis, .ustice Stevens first considered the legitimate interests
at issue and then evaluated whether the time, manner, place
restriction on speech activity was: content-neutral;4 8 narrowly
tailored to serve the legitimate interests, allowing ample alter-
nate means of communicating; not overbroad; 0 not imper-
missibly vague; and not acting as a prior restraint 
on speech. 2
"' Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 1999 WL
1211725, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856).
" Brief Amici Curiae of National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action
League, National Abortion Federation, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund in
Support of Respondents, 1999 WL 1186249, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480
(2000) (No. 98-1856).
" Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the
American Medical Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 1999 WL
1186250, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856).
14 Amici Brief of the City of Boulder and the City and County of Denver in Sup-
port of Respondents, 1999 WL 1186251, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. CL 2480 (2000) (No.
98-1856).
"s Brief Amici Curiae the State of New York, et al., in Support of Respondents,
1999 WL 1186258, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856). (states in-
cluded Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Mary-
land, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Vermont and Washington).
.Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2484 (2000).
1
47 See infra Part IV.A. 1.
'48 See infra Part IV.A.2.
1
4 9 See infra Part IV.A.3.
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1. The Opposing Interests
In analyzing the question of "whether the First Amendment
rights of the speaker are abridged by the protection the statute
provides for the unwilling listener,"' Justice Stevens first exam-
ined the concerns and constitutionally protected rights of those
on both sides of the debate that required balancing.' The
Court recognized that "[t] he First Amendment interests of peti-
tioners are clear and undisputed:" the speech is conducted on
the "quintessential" public forum of public sidewalks and
streets, therefore, normally protected. 5 On the other hand, the
State can exercise its traditional police powers to safeguard its
citizens' health, safety, and welfare, which "may justify a special
focus on unimpeded access to health care facilities and the
avoidance of potential trauma to patients associated with con-
frontational protests.' 56 The State also has an interest in the fa-
cilitation of unbiased and objective application of the law
through specific rules.
57
Justice Stevens then addressed the consideration of the in-
terests of unwilling listeners. The Colorado statute only impli-
cates communications to unwilling audiences, and while the
right to free speech includes the right to try to sway others to
one's viewpoint, "it does not always embrace offensive speech
that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid
it."158 The audience's ability to escape the communication is
significant as "[t] he First Amendment does not demand that pa-
tients at a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape
the cacophony of political protests."' 5' The privacy interests of
unwilling listeners varies with the location of the communica-
IS See infra Part L.A.4.
' See infra Part IV.A.5.
152 See infra Part IV.A.6.
155 Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2000).
,' Id. at 2488.
... Id. at 2488-89.
116 Id. at 2489.
157 id.
Id. (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (upholding a municipal or-
dinance restricting picketing activities in residential areas)).
... Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2000) (citing Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772-73 (1994)).
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tion, rising in importance near one's home and in situations
where one cannot avoid the message.'o
Similar to the Colorado Supreme Court in its opinion, Jus-
tice Stevens included the "interest in avoiding unwanted com-
munication" within the "right to be let alone" discussed by
Justice Brandeis in his Olmstead v. United States'' dissent.'6 The
Court supported the balancing of the audience's right to be let
alone along with unimpeded passage against the protestor's
right to free speech because the statute applied only to commu-
nications to unwilling listeners.'6o Denying the dissenters' con-
tention that it has created a "right to avoid popular speech in a
public forum," the Court instead stated that it was noting only
that precedent had "recognized the interests of unwilling listen-
ers in situations where 'the degree of captivity makes it imprac-
tical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure. " "A
Justice Stevens argued that past cases do not support the dis-
senters' contention that consideration of such interests in the
balancing was unconstitutional. He then re-identified the pro-
tection of patients' physical and emotional health along with
unfettered access to the medical facilities as the purposes for the
Colorado statute. 60
2. Content-Neutral Time, Place, and Manner Restriction
Next, the Court agreed with the four state court opinions
and ruled the statute a content-neutral time, place, and manner
regulation based on the standard from Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
cism"'6 "The principal inquiry in determining content neutral-
ity, in speech cases generally and in time, place, and manner
cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message
it conveys.' 67 The Colorado statute passes Wards test because:
(1) it regulates the places for speech and not the speech itself;
'6 Id. Justice Stevens related the ability to access medical facilities to the ability to
go to and from work that is identified in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central
Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 204 (1921).
161 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
' Hill, 120 S.Ct. at 2489-90.
Id. at 2490.
Id. (citingErznoznik v.Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208 (1975)).
" Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2491 n.25 (2000).
Id. at 2491 ( citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).
" Id. (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
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(2) the Colorado legislature did not adopt it as a result of dis-
agreeing with a particular message, and the statute applies
equally to all viewpoints and does not reference a specific sub-
ject matter; and (3) Colorado's interests in privacy, unimpeded
access, and even-handed enforcement were not correlated to
the speech's content.r
While the petitioners claimed the restriction is content-
based because one needs to examine the message to determine
if it constitutes "protest, education, or counseling," the Court re-
jected this argument, noting that mere examination of the
communication's content does not automatically make it con-
tent-based.'9 Many statutes require the evaluation of speech
content in order, for example, to determine if it is a threat,
agreement, or offer. 71 Justice Stevens declared that "[w]e have
never held, or suggested, that it is improper to look at the con-
tent of an oral or written statement in order to determine
whether a rule of law applies to a course of conduct.' 7' Citing
previous cases upholding restrictions on picketing and demon-
strating including Schenck and Madsen, the Court concluded that
the examination of whether an individual is demonstrating is no
less extensive than that necessary to determine if an individual is
counseling.7 The Court distinguished Carey v. Brown, 73 relied
on by the petitioners, because the statute rejected in Carey re-
stricted the particular subject matter of labor disputes whereas
Colorado's statute is not limited to a particular subject matter.'74
Because the Court concluded that the Colorado statute does not
restrict based on viewpoint or subject matter, the Court agreed
with the lower courts that the statute is content-neutral.
75
168 Id.
69 Id. at 2491-92. The Court addressed this argument, but noted that it was likely
waived by petitioners as it was not addressed in any of the four state court opinions.
120 S. Ct. at 2492. The Colorado Supreme Court's opinion stated that petitioners no
longer argued that the statute was content-based, conceding that a time, place, and
manner regulation's standard was appropriate. 120 S. Ct. at 2487, note 19 (citing Hill
v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1251 (1999)).
'70 Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2000).
171 Id.
17 Id.
17- 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
174 Hill, 120 S.Ct. at 2493. (Noting that anyone, including used car salesmen and
animal rights activists, who attempt to educate or counsel on any subject matter could
fall within the statute's restrictions.
175 Id. at 2492-94.
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3. Narrowly Tailored Regulation Allowing Other Communication Channels
Having concluded the statute is content-neutral and serves
legitimate government interests, Justice Stevens then declared
that the statute is narrowly tailored and provides sufficient al-
ternative channels for communication and is thus a "valid time,
place, and manner regulation.' 7 "As we have emphasized on
more than one occasion, when a content-neutral regulation
does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may
satisfy the tailoring requirement even though it is not the least
restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the statutory
goal."17 This statute, Justice Stevens wrote, does not entirely ex-
clude all means of communication-protestors still may display
signs, speak at a conversational volume, and pass out leaflets as
long as they stand still.'7 The Court distinguished Schenck be-
cause eight feet, unlike Schenck's fifteen feet, is a "normal con-
versational distance."'9 Significantly, a Colorado speaker does
not violate the statute if she stands in place, and including the
"knowing" requirement prevents inadvertent violations.'"
Focusing on the place where the regulations apply, the
Court highlighted Colorado's legitimate concerns specific to
healthcare facilities. 8' The Court found that such facilities-like
the schools, courthouses, and homes where previous decisions
had recognized government interests in protecting such places-
also implicate special concerns and government interests. '8
The Court noted that "[p]ersons who are attempting to enter
health care facilities-for any purpose-are often in particularly
vulnerable physical and emotional conditions. " "t The Court
then recognized that in protecting those persons the statute also
could limit harmless approaches, but declared that "[a] bright-
line prophylactic rule may be the best way to provide protection,
and, at the same time, by offering clear guidance and avoiding
'
76 Id. at 2494.
' Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2494 (2000).
'7' Id. at 2495 (The Court even argued that the eight-foot separation would make it
easier for the audience to see the signs and could encourage loud and aggressive pro-
testors to temper their conduct such that the peaceful petitioners could be heard).
" Id.
"D' Id.
... Id. at 2496.
" id.
" Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2000).
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subjectivity, to protect speech itself."' 84 The Court further noted
that this restriction is limited to one hundred feet from the en-
trance and is thus less restrictive than the ban on picketing out-
side of residences upheld in Frisby v. Schultz,' the restriction of
leafleting at a fairground in Heffron v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,8' or the frequently required silence
in areas outside of hospitals.'87 "Signs, pictures, and voice itself
can cross an 8-foot gap with ease,"'8 and therefore, the Court
concluded, Colo. Rev. Stat. section 18-9-122(3) is "reasonable
and narrowly tailored."'8
4. Not Overbroad
The Court rejected the petitioner's characterization of the
statute as "overbroad" because it impacts and protects too many
people and does not focus on facilities where disruptions had
occurred, stating that statutes which reach further than their in-
tended purposes are not thereby unconstitutional.'90 The Court
found that the same government interests are implicated for all
persons accessing a medical facility.'0 ' The statute's generality
renders it content-neutral' thus Ward is the appropriate stan-
dard The Court called the "comprehensiveness" of the statute a
"virtue," "because it is evidence against there being a discrimina-
tory governmental motive.' 92 The Court distinguished the cases
cited by the petitioners where the breadth of the statute re-
sulted in which a statute's breadth resulted in its extension to
protected activity. 9' In this case, the Court noted that the stat-
ute will indeed impact protected speech activity, and the
breadth alone does not cause the restriction on protected
speech.'94
In response to the petitioners' additional argument that the
statute is overbroad because it "bans virtually the universe of
184 id.
185 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
186 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981).
,7Hil 120 S. Ct. at 2496-97.
' Id. at 2496.
"9 Id. at 2497.
190 Id.
'9' Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2498 (2000).
'92 Id. at 2497.




protected expression, including the displays of signs, distribu-
tion of literature, and mere verbal statements,"t' the Court de-
clared that the statute does not actually "ban" any statements.)
Instead "[i] t merely regulates the places where communications
may occur."9 7 Moreover, the Court found that the impact on
other protestors whose conduct is implicated by the statute will
not differ from the impact on the petitioners; all are treated
similarly, legitimately falling within the sweep of the statute.,93
5. Not Vague
Furthermore, Justice Stevens rejected the argument that the
Colorado statute is unconstitutionally vague.'* He explained
that a statute might be vague either by failing to explain ade-
quately to people what is prohibited or by allowing or encourag-
ing inconsistent enforcement.m This statute does not fall into
either category because it contains a scienter requirement (the
law must be broken "knowingly") and people understand what
the words "approaching," ".consent," "protest, education, or
counseling" mean.20' The Court similarly rejected vagueness ar-
guments from Schenck 2 and Madsen."3 The Court determined
that what is important is the application of the statute not to a
far-fetched hypothetical, but to the typically encountered situa-
tion."4 Concluding that "it is clear what the ordinance as a
whole prohibits,"2 ' the Court noted that "because we are
'[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect
mathematical certainty from our language." Furthermore,
Justice Stevens found that the police are sufficiently guided by
the statute, including the specific distances of the zones at issue,
"s Id. at 2497.
1961d.
197Id.




519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997).
512 U.S. 753, 775-776 (1994).
Hi4 120 S. Ct. at 2498.




and thus, the amount of 0 olice judgment involved for enforce-ment is not problematic.
2
6. Not a Prior Restraint
Lastly, the Court discarded the argument that the consent
provision of the statute introduces an unconstitutional prior re-
straint on speech. 20 8 Noting that the Court rejected this argu-
ment in both Madsen and Schenck, Justice Stevens further argued
that "the restrictions in this case raise an even lesser prior re-
straint concern than those at issue in Schenck and Madsen, where
particular speakers were at times completely banned within cer-
tain zones. Under this statute, absolutely no channel of com-
munication is foreclosed."2 0 Furthermore, the Court contended
that prior restraints apply only to official censorship and, thus,
requiring an individual's consent to approach is not a prior re-
straint.2 " - Thus, the Court affirmed the Colorado Supreme
Court's judgment.2
B. CONCURRENCE BYJUSTICE SOUTER IN WHICH JUSTICES
O'CONNOR, GINSBURG, AND BREYERJOINED
Justice Souter joined the opinion of the Court, adding fur-
ther discourse on the analysis of whether a regulation of speech
is content-based.2 1 2  He explained that content-based regula-
tions, which include restrictions on both particular subjects and
viewpoints within a subject, face "strict scrutiny because they
place the weight of government behind the disparagement or
suppression of some messages, whether or not with the effect of
approving or promoting others., 213 Justice Souter distinguished
regulations of the circumstances of speech delivery from regula-
tions of the content of speech and noted that just because one is
engaged in speech does not immunize him from regulation of
his behavior while speaking. 14 To be content-based, the restric-
tion must be imposed because of the actual message within the
207 Id. at 2499.
2" Id. (Neither dissent addressed this issue).
20 Id.
2"10 Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2499 (2000).
211 Id.
212 Id. at 2499 (Souter,J., concurring).
211 Id. at 2499-2500 (SouterJ., concurring).
211 Id. at 2500 (SouterJ., concurring).
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communication and "not because of offensive behavior identi-
fied with its delivery."2 15 Justice Souter concluded that Colorado
regulations were introduced because of objectionable conduct
and were not designed to silence one side of the controversy. 216
The statute does not address a specific opinion since the indi-
vidual may stand in place and communicate any message that
the individual wishes, clearly showing that "the reason for [the
statute's] restriction on approaches goes only to the act of ap-
proaching, not to the content of the speech of those approach-
ing. 1
2 17
Justice Souter next addressed the breadth and clarity of the
statute.2"8 He dismissed the concern that subsection (3) may
apply to unintentional speakers by noting the requirement that
the speaker act "knowingly."21 9 Justice Souter "fail[s] to see dan-
ger of the substantial overbreadth required to be shown before
a statute is struck down out of concern for the speech rights of
those not before the Court."2 0 This is because he believes most
people near the entrances to the facilities will be using those fa-
cilities, and instances when the statute will unnecessarily reach
passersby will be rare. Justice Souter also found that the statute
is not impermissibly vague. Focusing on the word "education,"
he noted that it does not provide a significant limitation beyond
immunizing greetings or inquiries for assistance: "[w]hat is sig-
nificant is not that the word fails to limit clearly, but that it
pretty clearly fails to limit very much at all. "22' People subject to
the statute are likely to understand the word and will thus have
fair warning. Furthermore, the police discretion for enforce-
ment is not greater than when applying other general criminal
statutes.
22
C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT IN WHICHJUSTICE THOMASJOINED
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia provided an impassioned dis-
sent, attacking the majority for applying a different jurispru-
21 Id. at 2500-2501 (Souter, J., concurring).
216 Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2501 (2000) (Souter,J., concurring).
217 Id. (SouterJ., concurring).
'8 Id. at 2501-2 (Souter,J., concurring).
219 Id. (Souter,J., concurring).
' Id. at 2502 (SouterJ., concurring).
2' Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
22 Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2502 (2000) (SouterJ., concurring).
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dence to abortion cases than that applied to all other types of
cases. 2 2 Castigating the Court for its ruling, Justice Scalia stated
that because the regulated speech is that of abortion opponents,
the regulation "enjoys the benefit of the 'ad hoc nullification
machine' that the Court has set in motion to push aside what-
ever doctrines of constitutional law stand in the way of that
highly favored practice. 224
Justice Scalia first argued that the restriction on oral com-
munications is in fact content-based, because an approach for
any message other than one of protest, education, or counseling
would be permissible. 225 "Whether a speaker must obtain per-
mission before approaching within eight feet-and whether he
will be sent to prison for failing to do so-depends entirely on
what he intends to say when he gets there."22 Justice Scalia con-
tended the regulation would be deemed content-based if the
petitioners were antiwar protestors or union members, rather
than opponents of abortion.27
Similarly to his dissents in both Madsen and Schenck, Justice
Scalia argued that a restriction is content-based not only if it is
always used for "invidious, thought-control purposes," but also if
it creates a risk of such use.228 This restriction does just that.2 2
Utilizing a disparate impact argument, Justice Scalia declared
that:
[t]he Court's confident assurance that the statute poses no special threat
to First Amendment freedoms because it applies alike to 'used car sales-
men, animal rights activists, fundraisers, environmentalists, and mission-
aries,'. . . is a wonderful replication (except for its lack of sarcasm) of
Anatole France's observation that '[t]he law, in its majestic equality, for-
bids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges...230
Justice Scalia, convinced that the legislators were specifically
"taking aim at" abortion opponents, found that at some point
regulation of conduct is so connected with speech that it be-





2 Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2504 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Madsen v. Women's Health Care Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994)).




comes speech itself.2s "The strictures of the First Amendment
cannot be avoided by regulating the act of moving one's lips;
and they cannot be avoided by regulating the act of extending
one's arm to deliver a handbill, or peacefully approaching in
order to speak. " 2 2 In essence, restricting the place of speech is
the same as restricting speech and still must survive strict scru-
tiny.2
Under the strict scrutiny standard, Justice Scalia found the
statute unconstitutional, providing little explanation for his
conclusion.2 "Suffice it to say that if protecting people from
unwelcome communications (one of the governmental interests
the Court posits) is a compelling state interest, the First
Amendment is a dead letter." Next, Justice Scalia stated that
if... forbidding peaceful, nonthreatening, but uninvited speech from a
distance closer than eight feet is a 'narrowly tailored' means of prevent-
ing the obstruction of entrance to medical facilities (another of the gov-
ernment interests the State asserts) narrow tailoring must refer not to
the standards of Versace, but to those of Omar the tentmaker.2
Thus, Justice Scalia rejected one purported interest and
found the statute was not narrowly tailored to address the other
interest.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Colorado statute is a con-
tent-neutral, time, place, and manner restriction, Justice Scaliamaintained that it still failed under the corresponding stan-
dard.217 Examining the government interests in greater detail,
Justice Scalia first chastised the Court for relying primarily on an
interest that he claimed Colorado not onk failed to assert, but
also repudiated-the right to be let alone. Not only does Jus-
" Id. at 2505 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
1 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
23 Id. at 2504 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2507 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia defined the strict scrutiny test as requiring "the restriction be narrowly tailored




Id. at 2507-8 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "The interest that the Court makes the
linchpin of its analysis was not only unasserted by the State; it is not only completely
different from the interest that the statute specifically sets forth; it was explicitly dis-
claimed by the State in its brief before this Court, and characterized as a 'straw inter-
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tice Scalia believe the Court's denotation of the right as an "in-
terest" inappropriate, but he also thinks that the majority misin-
terprets the "interest" and that it actually supports his rejection
of the regulation. 39 If there is in fact such a right, it was tradi-
tionally a right imposed against the government and not against
fellow citizens.2 10 Thus, Justice Scalia found that such a right
would actually support "the right of the speaker in the public
forum to be free from government interference of the sort
Colorado has imposed here, 24' rather than the right of an indi-
vidual to be let alone from the speech of his fellow citizen.
Dismissing the idea of a captive audience on public sidewalks,
Justice Scalia found that outside the home, citizens have the
burden either to look away or to get away from any unwelcome
communication.2
Addressing what he considered the "real" state interest, "the
preservation of unimpeded access to health care facilities," Jus-
tice Scalia determined that subsection (2) adequately addresses
that interest while still being narrowly tailored. 43 Even though
he recognized that it was possible that subsection (2) would not
restrict some expressions that could impede access, he rejected
subsection (3) because he found it prohibits a "vast" amount of
harmless speech.244 Justice Scalia declared, "[t]he sweep of this
prohibition is breathtaking., 24 5 Justice Scalia not only criticized
the majority's standard for tailoring, but he also chided the ma-
jority for its naive belief that people converse at a distance of
eight feet apart on public sidewalks, as opposed to "in the quiet
of my chambers."2 6 He found the statute lacks a sufficient con-
nection between its goal of unimpeded access and the restrictive
provision, and rejected the "prophylactic approach" of the stat-
est' petitioners served up in the hope of discrediting the State's case." Id. at 2507-8
(citing Respondent's Brief, 1999 WL 1146869 at *25 n.19, Hill (No. 98-1856)).
2" Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
240 Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2508 (2000) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
211 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
212 Id. at 2509 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
211 Id. at 2510 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Subsection (2) states that a person is guilty of
a crime who "knowingly obstructs, detains, hinders, impedes, or blocks another per-
son's entry to or exit from a health care facility." COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(2)
(1999).
244 Id. at 2510 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
214 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
.46 Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2511 (2000) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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ute, declaring "[p]rophylaxis is the antithesis of narrow tailor-
ing."2
47
D. JUSTICE KENNEDYS DISSENT
Justice Kennedy began his dissent with the contention that
"[flor the first time, the Court approves a law which bars a pri-
vate citizen from passing a message, in a peaceful manner and
on a profound moral issue, to a fellow citizen on a public side-
walk." 48  Supporting Justice Scalia's analysis of the First
Amendment violation, Justice Kennedy characterized the major-
ity's analysis as a risk to the tradition of open communication in
public forums.249
Justice Kennedy, the author of the majority opinion uphold-
ing a noise-level restriction in Ward, found the Ward framework
inappropriate to the Colorado statute because he deemed it a
content-based restriction of speech. "m He distinguished cases
utilized by the majority by declaring that an officer need not ex-
amine the speech to determine if one is picketing or leafleting,
but would need to do so to evaluate if one is protesting, educat-
ing, or counseling.2 ' Justice Kennedy then concluded that to be
content-neutral, the statute would have to apply to every build-
ing, and not just every health-care facility, in the state of Colo-
rado, and thus the statute was realistically a topic-based
restriction. 2 "By confining the law's application to the specific
locations where the prohibited discourse occurs, the State has
made a content-based determination." 13 Ignoring the special
government considerations related to medical care and patient
safety, he analogized this restriction to a hypothetical restriction
that regulated "oral protest, education, or counseling" within
one hundred feet of a lunch counter, which he contended
would have been rejected as content-based by previous courts. -
"It should be a profound disappointment to defenders of the
217 Id. at 2512, 2514 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
2 Id. at 2516 (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
2" Id. (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
12 Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2517 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). (On





First Amendment that the Court today refuses to apply the same
structural analysis when the speech involved is less palatable to
it."
2 55
Justice Kennedy also characterized the statute as a view-
point-based restriction because of the inclusion of the word
"against" in the first subsection of the statute.5 6 He argued that
speech supporting abortion rights would not be a violation of
the statute, as statements like 'We are for abortion rights" would
not be "oral protest, education, or counseling. 2 , 7 Based on the
belief that the statute is a subject-matter and viewpoint-based
regulation, Justice Kennedy deemed it invalid.2 8
Additionally, Justice Kennedy stated that the statute was un-
constitutional because it is vague and overly broad. 2 9 Justice
Kennedy claimed, "the Colorado courts did not give the statute
a sufficient narrowing construction," and agreed that "protest'
"counseling," and "education" are not precise words, thus likely
chilling speech and enhancing the potential for biased en-
forcement and prosecution.260 He found ambiguity in the exe-
cution of the statute: the possibility of a protestor moving closer
to another patient while trying to maintain an eight-foot dis-
tance from a first patient, the possibility of unclear signals for
consent, and the inability to always know if a building contains
some sort of health facility.5 1 Justice Kennedy, therefore, re-
jected the criminal statute because of its lack of specificity.
22
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy also found that even if
the statute were content-neutral, it would not be a valid time,
manner, and place restriction because it burdens more speech
than necessary to achieve the government's interests.263 "Our
precedents do not permit content censoring to be cured by tak-
ing even more protected speech within a statute's reach. '' 2
Rather than restrict approaches to patients, Justice Kennedy
. Id. (KennedyJ., dissenting).
'6 Id- (KennedyJ., dissenting).
27 Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2517 (2000) (KennedyJ, dissenting).
Id. (KennedyJ, dissenting).
2,9 Id. at 2519 (KennedyJ., dissenting).
Id. at 2520 (KennedyJ, dissenting).
Id. (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
262 Id. at 2521 (KennedyJ, dissenting).
2 Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2521 (2000) (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
26' Id. at 2522 (KennedyJ, dissenting).
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would rely on criminal statutes proscribing battery and argued
that subsection (2) adequately addresses the issue of access to
facilities.s He further stated that subsection (3) does not pro-
vide "ample alternative channels for communication of the in-
formation" because the speaker should be able to select the
appropriate means and forum for delivery of the message.
Contending that "law forecloses peaceful leafleting," Justice
Kennedy then examined the history of leafleting and cited cases
holding that one has a right to tender, but not force another to
accept, a leaflet.
67
Lastly, Justice Kennedy examined how the majority's ruling
conflicts with the balanced approach of Planned Parenthood of SE
Pennsylvania v. Casey,26s whereby the Court curtailed legal protest
to eliminate abortions and left available the opportunity for
moral debate.2  Now, Justice Kennedy argued, the Court has
incorrectly abridged the moral discourse.
"no
V. ANALYSIS
The Court's holding that Colo. Rev. Stat. section 18-9-
122(3) is constitutional certainly was not predictable in light of
the Court's strong words against bubble zones in Schenck.'
While the Court in Madsen had ruled that statutes should be
judged more leniently than injunctions,/ the Hill Court, unlike
the Colorado Supreme Court, did not rely on this distinction in
its majority opinion.25 Interestingly, the author of the majority
opinion, Justice Stevens, actually argued in his separate opinion
in Madsen that statutes should be held to a more exacting scru-
tiny274 The Court, instead, chose to distinguish Schenck based on
the Colorado statute's smaller distance allowing normal conver-
sational volumes, as well as on the fact that a speaker need not
's Id. (KennedyJ, dissenting).
Id. at 2524 (KennedyJ, dissenting).
Id. at 2524-25 (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
m 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
69 Hi, 120 S. Ct. at 2529 (KennedyJ., dissenting).
Id. at 2529-30 (KennedyJ, dissenting).
2' In Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 378-79
(1997), ChiefJustice Rehnquist called the injunction's floating zone a "broad prohi-
bition" that burdened more speech than necessary.
272Madsen v. Women 's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764-765 (1994).
2Hill, 120 S. C. at 2480.
2 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 778 (Stevens,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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retreat and can stand in place without risk of criminal prosecu-
tion.275 The Court appropriately identified a principled means
of distinguishing Schenck and Madsen from Hill, and in so doing,
correctly found that the Colorado statute is a content-neutral
restriction that is adequately tailored to meet the relevant gov-
ernment interests.
A. WHICH STANDARD TO APPLY: CONTENT-NEUTRAL
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY OR CONTENT-BASED STRICT SCRUTINY
The majority correctly found that the Colorado statute im-
poses a content-neutral restriction on speech activity because it
targeted neither a specific subject matter, since it was not lim-
ited to the subject of abortion, nor a particular viewpoint, since
it was not limited to speech opposing abortion. While Justice
Scalia provided an interesting disparate impact-type argument
to support the characterization of the statute as content-based,2
the Court appropriately recognized that it is the government's
purpose, and not the result, that is significant.278 Realistically,
most statutes will have an impact on only certain groups. While
arguing that FACE does not violate the First Amendment, Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe stated: "It is crucial to recognize that
nothing in the First Amendment remotely shields objectively de-
fined, nonspeech conduct from regulation simply because many
or even most of those who engage in that conduct are likely to
share a certain philosophy or viewpoint."' The majority aptly
noted that a statute prohibiting solicitation at airports was uP0
held even though it was more likely to impact Hari-Krishnas.
Ward clarifies that, instead, the statute is content-neutral if it is
'Justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.,28' Here,
[t]he legislator who proposed what became subsection (3) expressly re-
ferred to that testimony [about intimidating and obstructive conduct by
anti-Medicaid and animal rights activists around medical facilities] in de-
25 Hil; 120 S. Ct. at 2495.
216 Id. at 2491-94.
277 Id. at 2504 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
27 Id. at 2491.
Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitutionality of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act of 1993, 1 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y& L. 291, 301 (1994).
28' Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2493-94 (2000).
2' Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
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scribing the 'overall purpose of this Bill, which is not directed solely to-
ward [any] type ... of clinic.. . , but, rather, towards the right of any
patient to seek the medical treatment they need.'
2
The majority, though, failed to address fully Justice Ken-
nedy's analogy to the restriction of speech outside a lunch
counter, which he contended would have been struck down as
content-based."' Justice Stevens, rewriting the hypothetical as
prohibiting anyone from sitting at a lunch counter for more
than an hour without making a purchase, declared that such a
statute also would not be content-based "(even if it were enacted
by a racist legislature that hated civil rights protestors (although
it might raise separate questions about the State's legitimate in-
terest at issue)). " However, the existence of legitimate inter-
ests seems inextricably intertwined with the analysis of whether a
restriction is content-based. The lack of a rational and justifi-
able government interest in the hypothetical statute betrays any
contention that the purpose is anything but racist and targeted
at those opposing segregation and thus shows that the purpose
of the restriction was to silence a message. A statute cannot be
'justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech"2 if it is not justified at all. In contrast, the government
has legitimate interests related to medical facilities that apply
regardless of the speaker's message.2" Thus, Justice Kennedy's
lunch counter example likely would be content-based while the
Colorado statute remains content-neutral.
There is no evidence that supports the contention that the
Colorado legislature was specifically targeting the anti-abortion
viewpoint, which would make it content-based. Justice Ken-
nedy's reliance on the word "against" from Colo. Rev. Stat. sec-
tion 18-9-122(1) to find that the Colorado legislator's purpose
was to target a viewpoint and make an abortion supporter im-
mune from prosecution is inappropriate. The inclusion of
this word merely hints at the fact that much of the evidence of
behavior the legislators were concerned with related to conduct
2 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, Hill
v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856).
2" Hil, 120 S. Ct. at 2517 (KennedyJ, dissenting).
2" Id. at 2494.
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
2 Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2491.
Id. at 2517 (Kennedy,J, dissenting).
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of animal-rights activists and abortion protestors questioning
medical procedures. However, the actual provision at issue,
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122(3) does not include the word
"against." The majority correctly asserted that an abortion ad-
vocate approaching a patient within eight feet to educate about
benefits of abortion also would violate this provision and be sub-
ject to criminal punishment.2 8 In all, the Court accurately
found the statute to be content-neutral: the restriction had nei-
ther a content-based purpose nor discriminated on its face be-
tween subjects or viewpoints.
B. THE RELEVANT GOVERNMENT INTERESTS
For a time, place, or manner limitation on speech to be
valid, it must serve significant and legitimate government inter-
ests.289 The majority identified several such interests for the
Colorado statute: protection of citizens' health and safety; un-
impeded access to health care facilities; prevention of patient
trauma from harassment or confrontation; and a "privacy inter-
est in avoiding unwanted communication" as a part of the right
to be let alone.290 Certainly it is within the police powers of the
state to safeguard the public peace and prevent violence against
persons.2 1 By preventing in-your-face interactions and commu-
nications, the State is effectively preventing not only violence
against the patients but also retaliatory violence by distressed pa-
tients.
Justice Scalia argued that the right to be let alone only ap-
plies to the private citizen's right to escape interference by the
government, and not by an individual.29  This contradicts Su-
preme Court precedent in Frisby, whereby the interest in pro-
tecting an unwilling listener in his home-residential privacy---
justified an ordinance limiting picketing in residential 
areas.
The Court invoked a privacy right against interference by an in-
dividual against another individual.' ' Similarly, the right to be
Id. at 2494.
' Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
r Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2000).
'9' Brief Amici Curiae the State of New York, et al., in Support of Respondents,
1999 WL 1186258, Hilly. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 98-1856).
m Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2508 (Scalia, J., dissenting).




let alone may be invoked to protect patients from demonstra-
tors at healthcare facilities. In Bering v. SHARE, the Washington
Supreme Court similarly noted that protection of personal pri-
vacy "even from private invasion, constitutes a compelling State
interestjustifying a reasonable place restriction on picketing."-
Turning to the undisputed government interest of unim-
peded access to the health care facilities, Justice Kennedy incor-
rectly found that the law of battery or torts sufficiently addresses
this concern2 5 The records of violence that led the Supreme
Court to uphold the injunctions in Schenck or Madsen betray the
effectiveness of such laws. Furthermore, Justice Scalia was in-
correct when he failed to find a sufficient connection between
the goal of unimpeded access and subsection (3).297 It is clear
that people will be better able to safely enter a facility if no one
can approach within eight feet to block them. The Court
needed to find only one compelling government interest; here,
there were multiple legitimate interests at stake.
C. THE CAPTIVE AUDIENCE DOCTRINE
While there is consensus that the statute is focused on a
public forum, the majority also hints that the recipients of the
speech at issue are unique based on their inability to avoid the
speech2 s Some argue that because the patients cannot rea-
sonabIy avoid the speech, they are captive audiences-similar to
an individual in his home.m The Supreme Court has upheld
restrictions on picketing and protests in residential areas, de-
scribing the target of such speech as "figuratively, and perhaps
literally, trapped within the home, and because of the unique
and subtle impact of such picketing is left with no ready means
of avoiding unwanted speech."3 The Supreme Court extended
the captive audience doctrine outside of the home in other
cases such as Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, where the Court ap-
plied the doctrine to passengers on public buses!"' In Lehman v.
' Bering v. SHARE, 721 P.2d 918 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).
Hi!, 120 S. Ct. at 2522 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia instead deter-
mined that subsection (2) of the statute adequately addressed this government inter-
est. Id. at 2510.
' Id. at 2510 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
Id. at 2489-90.
2'Ellis & Wu, supra note 17, at 578.
' Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988).
'422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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City of Shaker Heights, the Court limited political advertising on
buses because it considered the passengers captive.3 12 "In bal-
ancing these competing rights, the Court's prior cases reveal
that it applies the captive audience doctrine when: (1) a strong
privacy interest is implicated; (2) the target cannot practically
avoid unwanted communication; and (3) the restriction on
speech is minimal.0
0 3
Madsen hinted that the doctrine could apply to medical pa-
tients when citing the lower court's contention that "targeted
picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the psycho-
logical, but also the physical well-being of the patient held 'cap-
tive' by medical circumstance."3 0 In Hill, the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the American Medical
Association argued that the medical patient is a "classic captive
audience, with greater interests than bus passengers. ' '30 It is
more arguable that a bus passenger could walk or take other
means of transportation, but a medical patient has fewer op-
tions to avoid the unwanted communication. "[U]nlike the cap-
tive audience on the streetcar, an individual seeking medical
care, particularly medical care relating to reproductive matters,
has important interests in privacy and anonymity, and is 'practi-
cally helpless to escape th [e] interference with his [or her] pri-
vacy. 0 0 Moreover, the government has an interest in ensuring
that patients get the medical care they need. We should want
women to get prenatal care, and both men and women to get
treatment as early as possible for ailments. "Ultimately, the legis-
lature acted to preserve the right of all Coloradoans to choose
'health services which could save their lives, such as cancer
screening and treatment, routine medical examinations and
pap smears.0'30 7 Therefore, "[t]he state's interest is particularly
compelling here ... because it seeks to protect individual inter-
ests in privacy and anonymity, as well as health and safety, in a
context in which individuals, absent state intervention, are un-
418 U.S. 298 (1974).
'"3 Ellis & Wu, supra note 17, at 578.
' Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994). See Ellis &
Wu, supra note 17, at 580.
50' Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the
American Medical Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 20, Hill
v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856).
'Id. at 21-22
Respondents' Brief at 10, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856).
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able acting alone to protect those interests. " s"s As some have ar-
gued, the captive audience doctrine should 9rovide protection
to "people in coercive situations, not places."
The captive audience doctrine test is met since the patients'
privacy interests are at issue, there is minimal restriction of ex-
pression, and the patient cannot practically avoid the communi-
cations. This doctrine, thus, supports the constitutionality of
the Colorado statute. In calling the suggestion that an individ-
ual could be captive on a public sidewalk "absurd,"1 ° Justice
Scalia completely ignored the fact that the relevant public ways
are specifically outside of medical facilities and that it is not so
simple to walk away when one may require access to obtain
needed medical attention. The Hill opinion itself notes only
that prior cases have recognized the interests of captive, unwill-
ing listeners and fails to explicitly address whether the doctrine
applies to the circumstances s" The Court, hesitant to extend
the doctrine, retreats to the government's interests in ensuring
clinic access and safeguarding patients' emotional and physical
health tojustify the statute's restriction.
D. CATCH-22s: NARROWLY TAILORED/OVERBROAD V. CONTENT-
BASED AND THE EXISTENCE OF PRINCIPLED ANALYSIS
313
In Hill the majority and the dissenters disputed the means
of analyzing whether a content-neutral restriction is narrowly
tailored. Collapsing the analysis of narrow tailoring and alterna-
tive means of communicating, Justice Stevens focused on the
determination that the statute did not foreclose any means of
communication and that, under Ward, the statute need not be
the least restrictive means of addressing the interests on which
' Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the
American Medical Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 22, Hill
v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856).
3 6J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L REV. 2295, 2312
(1999)(arguing that the captive audience doctrine is better suited to workplace
speech than speech in the home).
310 Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct 2480,2509 n.3 (2000) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
... I& at 2490.
Id. at 2490 n.25.
Respondents refer to Petitioners' arguments against the statute as overbroad
and/or content-based as a constitutional Catch-22. Respondents' Brief at 18 n.17,
Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct 2480 (2000) (No. 98-1856).
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the statute was grounded.1 Ward declared that the existence of
less restrictive means does not make a restriction invalid as long
as "the means chosen are not substantially broader than neces-
sary to achieve the government's interest." 15 This indicates what
a statute cannot be, but does not clarify what a content-neutral
statute must be. Justice Scalia criticized the majority for imply-
ing that "narrow tailoring can be relaxed when there are other
speech alternatives", but he then failed to explain what narrow
tailoring itself is and how to separate its analysis from considera-
tion of alternatives.31 6 After Hill, while it remains evident that
the standard is less restrictive than the "least restrictive means"
applied to content-based restrictions, it is unclear what the true
test of narrowly tailored is for content-neutral restrictions.
In drafting this statute, the Colorado legislature encoun-
tered a significant challenge in how to make the statute nar-
rowly tailored without making it content-based, while still
addressing the relevant interests. While the majority believes
the legislature succeeded in this regard, it is clear that the Colo-
rado legislature could not have rewritten this statutory provision
such that the dissenters would uphold it. If the legislature made
it narrower, then the dissenters would have had even stronger
arguments for a content-based analysis. On the other hand, the
dissents attacked the statute for not being narrowly tailored.
3 '
In oral argument, a Justice noted that the petitioners "argue, on
one hand the statute is too broad and, on the other hand, it's
too narrow."
318
Admittedly, the statute does apply to the entrance of every• • •311
healthcare facility in the state of Colorado. The subject of
much discussion during oral argument, the Justices and attor-
neys determined that the statute would apply to a one hundred
foot radius from the front door of any building with a doctor's
office, even if the office was on the eighteenth floor and sur-
rounded by non-medical offices, as long as it coincided with a
" Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2494. In contrast, United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1886 (2000), explains that content-based restrictions
face the strictest scrutiny and must be the least restrictive means available.
3" Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
116 Hil 120 S. Ct. at 2511 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
7 d. at 2514 (ScaliaJ., dissenting); Id. at 2522-23 (KennedyJ, dissenting).
Transcript of Oral Argument, 2000 WL 72054 at *26 (Jan. 19, 2000).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(4) (1999).
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public way.320 Even though Justices reacted negatively to this
reach, they did not suggest a preferable approach. While alter-
natives might limit the application to only free-standing clinics
or medical facilities that constitute some percent of a building,
the same government interests apply regardless of the set-up of
the facility, and any other approach appears to be an arbitrary
line-drawing. The government interests of protecting patients
from stressful harassment and providing clear access to the fa-
121cilities remain.
While at first glance it may appear that there is no princi-
pled approach for analyzing these zones, this is incorrect. The
decision to uphold an eight-foot bubble zone in Hill and reject a
fifteen-foot bubble in Schenck may seem like arbitrary line draw-
ing. However, the distance is significant to assess whether the
regulations allow sufficient alternative means of communication
and to determine whether any means of speech are actually
foreclosed.3 2 The Court's rationale that an eight-foot distance
allows normal conversational volumes, while a fifteen-foot dis-
tance does not, is not a hollow means of distinguishing Schenck.
Instead, the difference in distance ensures that no method of
communication (normal conversational volumes, sign display,
and leafleting) is eliminated."'
The Colorado legislators focused on this requirement when
deciding on the eight-foot distance: it was not a result of a ran-
dom selection of a number, but rather a measurement of a dis-
tance where they felt people still could communicate but
harassment would be prevented.324 To prove that point, the
Chairwoman of Colorado's Senate Judiciary Committee set up
the witness table at a distance of eight feet from her seat and
then told any witnesses that contended that eight feet was too
great a distance for communicating a message that she was able
to hear them without problem. In oral argument the Justices
discussed distances in relation to the corresponding potential
for intimidation.32 6 When petitioners were unwilling to accept a
' Transcript of Oral Argument, 2000 WL 72054 at *32-43 (Jan. 19, 2000).
Hi 120 S. CL at 2497-98.
2 Id at 2495, 2499.
Id. at 2495.
'2 Soraghan, supra note 67.
Transcript of Oral Argument, 2000 WL 72054 at *9-12 (Jan. 19, 2000).
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hypothetical bubble reduced to six inches or even an eighth of
an inch, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the traditional con-
cept of public forum speech was an individual speaking from
atop a soap box.2 7 The combination of the ability to remain
standing in place with the normal conversational distance led to
the conclusion that no means of communication are truly fore-
closed.328 This statute is less restrictive than many upheld previ-
ously by the Court, while protecting the significant interest of
access to medical care.32
E. IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT RULING
This Supreme Court decision likely will have a significant
impact on the number of states choosing to enact similar legisla-
tion and the manner in which these states tailor the language of
their statutes. The president for the New York NOW Legal De-
fense and Education Fund stated, "This creates a road map for
legislators across the country to exercise their responsibility to
ensure that women have safe, unimpeded access to reproductive
health care."3  The fact that eighteen states joined in an amicus
brief supporting the constitutionality of the Colorado statute
may indicate that more states support and will enact such stat-
utes.31
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision, Massachusetts
lawmakers retooled a pending bill to make it similar to the
Colorado statute.3 2 The original bill, which already had passed
in the Senate,33 barred protestors from entering a twenty-five
foot buffer zone surrounding a clinic and was abandoned by the
-' Id. at *11-12.
'2 Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2495.
32 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (upholding a statute prohibiting re-
strictions on gathering near an embassy); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972) (upholding ordinance that prohibited demonstrations outside of schools dur-
ing school-hours); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (upholding statute prohibit-
ing picketing outside courthouses when picketing attempted to influence the
proceedings).
"2 Romano, supra note 66.
31 Id.
"' Daniel Barbarisi, Lesser-Known Bills Finally Get Attention, BOSTON GLOBE, July 30,
2000, at A19. The Massachusetts House passed the bill on July 28, 2000, by a vote of
107-48 and the Senate approved the bill onJuly 29, 2000. Id.
..s Michael Rezendes, Abortion Clinic Buffer Zone Ok 'd. Lawmakers Reach a Compromise
on Controversial Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, July 27, 2000, at B7.
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legislators just a few days prior to the amended bill's passage.3"
The modified bill institutes an eighteen-foot zone around clinic
entrances as well as a six-foot "corridor" between the entrances
and the sidewalk. The measure also creates a six-foot bubble
zone around people accessing the clinic and incorporates the
Colorado statute's provision of prohibiting knowingly approach-
ing another "for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to,
displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or
counseling" within that zone. Thus, while similar in wording
to the Colorado statute, it covers a smaller area: the buffer zone
is eighteen feet, as opposed to Colorado's one hundred feet,
and the bubble zone is six feet, as opposed to Colorado's eight
feet.
Members of the pro-life community supported the modifi-
cation to the bill because they believed it allowed greater inter-
action with patients.36 Members of the pro-choice community
supported passage as well, since they believe it provided at least
some protection to the targets of the protests, noting that Colo-
rado clinics have communicated to them a decline in tension
and harassment since the Colorado law went into effect.' 37 Sig-
nificantly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had issued
an advisory opinion earlier in the year that the original buffer
zone would be constitutional.ssa Thus, even with this decision
and successful passage in the Senate, some legislators were ar-
guably able to use the Colorado ruling to gain a compromise
and pass a less stringent bill.39
Surprisingly, just ten days after the law went into effect,
United States District Court Judge Edward F. Harrington issued
a preliminary injunction on November 20, 2000, barring the
Karen E. Crummy, House Oks Weakened Bill on Clinc Protests, BOSTO.' HERALD,
July 29, 2000, at 5.
MASS. GEN. IAWS. ch. 266, § 120E (b) (2000). See also Crummy, supra note 334.
Crummy, supra note 334:
"We think it's favorable to use since the new (bill) allows more contact and interacuon vath
those entering the clinic than the old bill," said Ray Neary, president of the Massachusetts
Committee for Life, who pointed out that his organization is still opposed to the measure
in its entirety on free speech grounds, " e are very happy that pro-tife legislators included
(those provisions) in it."
337 id.




state from enforcing the law.30 Judge Harrington distinguished
the Massachusetts statute from its Colorado counterpart on two
fronts: (1) the Massachusetts statute exempts clinic employees
and volunteers acting within the scope of their employment and
(2) the Massachusetts statute applies only to abortion clinics,
rather than all health care facilities31 Judge Harrington argued
that these characteristics made the statute uniquely directed to-
ward abortion speech, creating an unequal opportunity for pro-
life advocates to communicate their message, and he concludedS • 342
it was unconstitutional. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit issued an order staying the preliminary in-
junction on December 20, declaring that the harm to public
safety outweighed the potential effect on speech.3 3 Massachu-
setts may enforce the law until the Attorney General's appeal is
heard . It will be interesting to see the First Circuit's consid-
eration of the focus of the statute on abortion clinics alone since
the prophylactic approach of the Colorado's statute to all medi-
cal facilities and its general application was a cornerstone of
Stevens' opinion.4
Even so, the three provisions of the Colorado statute that
likely will have progeny include: (1) the use of the word "ap-
proaching" to indicate that a protestor may remain in place, (2)
the absence of a requirement to withdraw from a target, and (3)
the use of bubble zones rather than entire buffer zones, setting
the bubble size at a distance of eight feet or less-a conversa-
34o See McGuire v. Reilly, 122 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D. Mass. 2000). See also Shelley Mur-
phy, USJudge Rejects Abortion Clinic Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 21, 2000, at Al.
McGuire, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 102-103.
342 Id. While Judge Harrington contends that the "government must never take
sides in the battle of ideas and ideals in the traditional public forum", his opinion it-
self has been criticized for bias. Planned Parenthood of Massachusetts President Di-
anne Luby believes that "[t]he tone in certain places exhibits a personal opinion
versus a judicial opinion. It read as a person inserting their own opinion about
choice into a legal opinion." J.M. Lawrence, Fed Judge KOs Abortion-Clinic Buffer Zone,
BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 21, 2000, at Al. Judge Harrington included dialog that related
a pro-choice advocate's consideration of an unborn fetus to the "non-person status"
assigned to slaves in the South and Jews in Germany during the Holocaust. McGutre,
122 F. Supp. 2d at 104 n.10.
33 Doug Hanchett, Fed Court Restores Clinic Buffer Zone, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 23,
2000, at A5; Shelley Murphy, Court Gives Go-Ahead on Buffer Zones. State to Enforce Its
New LawforAbortion Clinics, THE BOSTON GLOBE, December 23, 2000, at Al.
.. Hanchett, supra note 343; Murphy, supra note 340.
... Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2491, 2493, 2496, 2497 (2000).
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tional distance. Such bubble zones are less restrictive on speech
since individuals may remain at any distance from the clinic as
long as they do not take certain actions.3" For example, Denver
city officials soon will consider revising a 1990 city ordinance
that mirrors the Colorado statute, except that the ordinance re-
quires a protestor to withdraw if a target requests. 7 A woman
who had been charged with violating the statute (the charges
were later dropped) filed a federal lawsuit challenging the ordi-
nance as an impermissible restriction on her freedom of
speech.m8 Thus, it is clear that one focus of statutory challenges
will be the existence of omission culpability for failing to with-
draw from a patient.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the muddied world of First Amendment jurisprudence,
Hill provides some guidance to states in drafting constitutional
buffer zone legislation. In future cases, courts should apply the
analysis in Hill to uphold such legislation as long as the distance
does not eliminate normal conversation, a violation does not re-
suit from standing in place, and the general statute is not
adopted to silence the content of the speaker's message, appli-
cable to the proscribed speech activity regardless of the subject
matter or viewpoint. The Court's analysis of the Colorado stat-
ute as a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction that
provides sufficient means of communicating messages was ap-
propriate.
With the addition of Hill v. Colorado to the Supreme Court's
abortion protest jurisprudence, one may consider the following
restrictions constitutional: injunctions creating fixed buffer
zones and, now, statutes establishing bubble zones (where one
could speak to another at a conversational level) within a fixed
buffer zone. It is worth noting that the United States Supreme
Court has not ruled on a case involving a statutory fixed buffer
zone, less any bubble zone, which prohibits any entry within the
fixed radius.
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